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OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT IN DISPUTED WATERS UNDER UNCLOS 
Constantinos Yiallourides* 
 
Abstract: Maritime delimitation is crucial in determining which coastal States may exercise 
control and jurisdiction over certain hydrocarbon deposits. Although international law has 
recently become more precise on the matter, boundary disputes are frequently resolved only 
after several or even many years. Even while coastal States are in a deadlock over delimitation 
issues, the need to explore and exploit the disputed areas’ resources remains imperative for 
reasons of energy security, social welfare and economic development. Thus, the question arises 
as to the rights and obligations of coastal States with respect to the development of natural 
resources in areas subject to overlapping claims. 
Against this background, the paper examines the relevant provisions of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, international jurisprudence and State practice. The 
central argument advanced is that in the absence of an agreed boundary or a provisional 
cooperative agreement, none of the States concerned operates legitimately in unilaterally 
undertaking petroleum operations in the disputed area, including seismic surveys, should the 
conduct of such operations prove to aggravate the dispute. Finally, this paper considers the 
practical implications of the aforementioned legal position on the development of hydrocarbon 
resources in areas subject to overlapping maritime claims. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It would not be unreasonable to say that most of the world’s maritime boundary conflicts have 
been resource-induced, most commonly by the known or suspected presence of mineral and 
fossil-fuel deposits lying in areas over which two or more coastal States may claim control and 
jurisdiction.1 Indeed, given that each square metre of subsea territory may potentially hold 
energy resources worth millions of dollars, the precise location of the boundary would not be 
a matter of indifference to either of the coastal neighbours affected. It follows that maritime 
delimitation is crucial in determining which State controls the said resources. However, even 
though international law has become more precise on the issue in recent times, experience 
shows that boundary disputes are not infrequently resolved only after several years. 2 It is 
understandable that, although the exact location of the boundary remains uncertain, the need 
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1 Jan Paulsson, ‘Boundary Disputes Into The Twenty-First Century: Why, How...And Who?’ (2001) 95 ASIL 
122, 123. 
2 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation (Hart Publishing 2006) 
125, 129 -130; Judge Peter Tomka, ‘Speech to the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly’ (2 November 
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for exploiting mineral resources of an overlapping area remains imperative for the States 
affected. 
It is for this reason that the legal regime governing the economic exploitation of areas 
subject to overlapping claims has for many years been a source of discussion and extensive 
research. Indeed, in the past several decades many leading international law experts such as 
Professors Lagoni,3 Miyoshi,4 Fox,5 and Churchill6 have sought to determine the rights and 
duties of States, pending the final settlement of their boundaries and the possible interim 
solutions. Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (hereafter, UNCLOS or 1982 Convention),7 the only provisions that deal directly with the 
duties of States ‘pending agreement’ on delimitation, do not contain any express rules against 
the prohibition of any particular oil and gas activities in the disputed area. Instead, they impose 
an open-ended obligation on States to refrain from any acts that would ‘jeopardize or hamper’ 
the final delimitation agreement. Yet, the question about what kind of economic activities 
would have the effect of jeopardising or hampering the final delimitation agreement remains 
critically unanswered. 
One of the main findings of previous studies with respect to petroleum operations in 
disputed areas is that States are under an international obligation to refrain from undertaking 
any acts related to drilling of wells, establishment of installations and appropriation of 
petroleum.8 This obligation seems to derive from conventional law, such as UNCLOS, and is 
also said to be reflected in customary international law as a general obligation of ‘mutual 
restraint’. On the other hand, seismic exploration surveys have traditionally been considered as 
being ‘legally permissible’, even when conducted without the other interested parties’ consent.9 
Interestingly, one of the main reasons offered for the above distinction is that, whereas the 
former acts can have a permanent physical impact on the marine environment of the disputed 
area, seismic surveys, due to their transitory character, cannot have such effect. 
What is rather questionable, however, is how this rule has come to be and whether it is 
consistent with the rules of present international law. The main reason underlying this question 
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is the fact that most of the initial studies on the topic were largely based on examples from case 
law that predated the 1982 Convention, such as the North Sea Delimitation Cases of 1969,10 
the Aegean Sea Case of 1976,11 and the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case of 1974.12 Given that 
UNCLOS only came into force in 1994, it follows that most, if not all, of these cases had been 
adjudicated on the basis of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention (the 1958 Convention).13 
However, the 1958 Convention did not contain any rules or provisions dealing with the rights 
and obligations of States pending delimitation. Such provisions in the form of Articles 74(3) 
and 83(3), for example, were only introduced by the 1982 Convention: that is, 24 years later. 
Nor did State practice regarding offshore petroleum activities provide much evidence in this 
regard, largely because of the limited deep-sea drilling capabilities prior to the 70s or early 
80s.14 As a consequence, the status of knowledge with regard to the duties of States pending 
delimitation was rather limited before UNCLOS came into force. Indeed, in the words of 
Churchill and Ulfstein, ‘it is not clear what activities are caught by this provision. The basic 
rule itself will be strengthened if or when the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea enters 
into force’.15 
Therefore, while by no means irrelevant, these early case-studies cannot be said to form 
the best set of evidence in terms of determining the substantial content of States’ obligations 
pending delimitation under present international law. Rather, any conclusion deriving from 
these initial studies needs to be critically reviewed in the light of the more recent case law and 
State practice. In stark contrast to this important realisation, it can be observed that even the 
most recent studies on the topic tend to re-cite the conclusions of previous scholars without 
attempting to understand the evidence on which these conclusions were based.16 
Notwithstanding their manifest political nature, maritime disputes, ie disputes 
pertaining to the use of the oceans and the seas, are primarily a legal matter governed by the 
rules and principles of the law of the sea which operates within and draws authority from the 
overall normative framework of public international law. As a consequence, maritime disputes 
must be reviewed against the overarching framework of public international law at large. Key 
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is examining the different ‘sources’ from which the rules of international law, including those 
relevant to the law of the sea, may be extracted and analysed.17 
For the reasons explained above, the aim of this paper is to shine some fresh light on 
the evolution of the aforementioned rule in order to ascertain its validity and consistency with 
the present international law. In doing so, the present paper adopts a more holistic approach: 
taking into account both previous studies as well as recent examples from case law and State 
practice. The central argument advanced is that, in the absence of an agreed boundary or a 
provisional cooperative agreement, none of the interested States would operate legitimately in 
undertaking unilateral petroleum activities in areas subject to dispute, should the conduct of 
such activities prove to aggravate the dispute. 
In addition to the above, even though a considerable amount of research has been 
devoted to the legal duties of States pending delimitation and the possible interim solutions 
(joint development schemes, for instance), rather less attention has been paid to the practical 
consequences or implications of said legal duties. In other words, while the majority of authors 
simply restate the obligations of States in the absence of an agreed boundary and then move on 
to propose possible solutions, there has been little discussion about how exactly these conflicts 
impact on oil and gas development in disputed areas. Nevertheless, as a prerequisite for offering 
a solution, it is necessary first of all to understand the problem, not least from its legal 
perspective, but also from its commercial and geo-political perspectives. Therefore, this paper 
also highlights the commercial and political considerations inherent to the exploration and 
exploitation of disputed subsea mineral and fossil-fuel deposits. This will not only contribute 
to the overall and in-depth understanding of the various problems associated with the 
exploitation of disputed natural resources but more importantly, it will provide some clarity on 
where a possible solution to unlock these practical hurdles might lie. 
 
                                                 
17 According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is universally accepted as the 
most authoritative statement of the formally recognised sources of international law, in deciding international 
disputes brought to it, the Court shall apply: a) international conventions; b) international custom; c) the general 
principles of law; and e) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (1945) 39 AJIL Supp 215. 
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B. CONTESTED WATERS: MARITIME SPACES UNDER OVERLAPPING 
SOVEREIGN CLAIMS 
Under both conventional18 and customary19 international law, all coastal States are entitled to 
a continental shelf area, extending to at least 200 nautical miles (nm) from their coastal 
baselines, over which they enjoy ‘sovereign rights’ for the purpose of exploring and exploiting 
their subsea natural resources. These rights exist ipso facto and ab initio20 in the sense that no 
special legal acts or declarations need to be performed for such rights to be enacted.21 More 
importantly, these rights are ‘exclusive’ in the sense that if a coastal State chooses not to 
explore or exploit the continental shelf areas appertaining to it, no one else may do so without 
its express consent.22 Likewise, all coastal States are entitled to an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) 23  extending up to 200nm from the coastal baselines over which they also enjoy 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting their offshore natural resources, 
though this zone applies both to non-living, such as oil and gas, and living resources, such as 
fisheries.24 Finally, it is important to note that by virtue of their sovereign rights over their 
offshore mineral resources, both in the context of the EEZ and the continental shelf, coastal 
States also enjoy the exclusive right and jurisdiction to authorise geophysical surveys,25 as well 
as construct, operate and use installations and any other structures necessary for the exploration 
and exploitation of their natural resources.26  
If a coastal State’s right to claim a continental shelf, and/or an EEZ, does not overlap 
with a similarly exercisable right by a neighbouring State, the establishment of such zones may 
be effected unilaterally pursuant to the aforementioned rules of international law.27 If, however, 
the exercise of a coastal State’s entitlement to the above maritime zones interferes with another 
State’s similar entitlement in the same area, when, for example, the distance between the two 
                                                 
18 Art 6, 1958 Convention; Arts 76 and 77, UNCLOS. 
19 North Sea CS Cases (n 10) para 19; Continental Shelf Case (Libya/Malta) [1985] ICJ Rep 15 para 39. 
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21 ibid; David M Ong, ‘Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice or 
Customary International Law?’ (1999) 93 (4) AJIL 771, 775. 
22 Art 77 (3), UNCLOS; Article 81 of UNCLOS grants coastal States the ‘exclusive’ right to authorize and regulate 
drilling on the continental shelf for all purposes; North Sea CS Cases (n 10) para 19. 
23 Art 57, UNCLOS. 
24 ibid. See also David J Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Clarendon Press 1987) 54-
61. 
25 Art 56(1)(b)(ii) and 253, UNCLOS. 
26 Art 60 and 80 mutandis mutandis UNCLOS; Attard (n 24) 54-61. 
27 Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (2nd edn, MN 2005) 2; Myron 
H Nordquist and others (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A commentary (Vol 2, 
Martinus Nijhoff 1985) 813 (Virginia Commentary). 
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coastal States is less than 400nm, the process of maritime delimitation must be initiated as a 
means to determine where the dividing line between the two entitlements lies.28 
The above definitional framework gives rise to an important distinction: the entitlement 
to a certain maritime area and the delimitation of that area between two, or more, adjacent or 
opposite coastal States.29 On the one hand, delimitation is a process which has a de facto 
subsidiary nature in the sense that it becomes necessary only once overlapping claims have 
occurred.30 On the other hand, the inherent nature of a coastal State’s sovereign rights over its 
continental shelf means that this maritime area appertains to the State, regardless of whether it 
has been previously delimited or not.31 Paragraph 10 of Article 76 of UNCLOS concerning the 
definition of the continental shelf provides that, ‘the provisions of this article are without 
prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite 
or adjacent coasts’. Therefore, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in its Libya/Malta 
judgement, the questions of entitlement to continental shelf, on the one hand, and of 
delimitation of continental shelf on the other, ‘are not only distinct but are also 
complementary’.32 Indeed, the process of delimitation, ‘cannot constitute, or derogate from, 
the general entitlement under international law of each state to its portion of the continental 
shelf’.33 Accordingly, maritime delimitation is not used to determine what a State’s entitlement 
to a continental shelf, and/or an EEZ is, but rather to draw a dividing line ‘between areas which 
already appertain [in principle] to one or other of the States affected’.34 
In light of this consideration, it seems that in the absence of such ‘dividing line’, a legal 
presumption exists that each of the States concerned is, in principle, entitled to, and may validly 
claim the relevant rights in the area in question.35 Indeed, as Professor Miyoshi explains: 
In as much as a State has sovereign rights over its continental shelf under customary 
international law… the other State also has [equally] its sovereign rights over its 
share… even if it does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources.36  
                                                 
28 Douglas M Johnston and Philip M Saunders, Ocean Boundary Making: Regional Issues and Developments 
(Croom Helm 1988) 17; Tanaka (n 2) 7-8. 
29 Daniel P O’Connell (ed), The International Law of the Sea (Vol 1, Clarendon Press 1982) 691-692. 
30 Gerard J Tanja, The Legal Determination of International Maritime Boundaries (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers 1990) xvi.  
31 Churchill and Ulfstein (n 6) 86. 
32 Libya/Malta Case (n 19) paras 27, 28.  
33 O’Connell (n 29) 692. 
34 North Sea CS Cases (n 10) paras 18, 20. 
35 Ong (n 21) 773. 
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In other words, both states claim the same exploration and exploitation rights over the same 
geographic area, yet, pending the final resolution of the dispute, the ‘exclusive’ holder of these 
rights remains unknown. It is clear that the alleged rights cannot be said to be exclusive to both 
states concerned.37 Moreover, as the ICJ observed, ‘evidently any dispute about boundaries 
must involve that there is a disputed marginal or fringe area, to which both parties are laying 
claim’.38 In this case, it is presumed that each bona fide claim is legally valid and that each of 
the claimants is legally entitled to claim the relevant rights to the area in question.39 Yet, it is 
one thing to be ‘entitled to claim’ and it is another to be ‘entitled to exercise’ the asserted rights. 
Indeed, as it will be seen further below, albeit legally entitled to continental shelf and EEZ 
rights, none of the disputing parties may, from a legal point of view, unilaterally exercise these 
rights, prior to the final settlement of the dispute. This is because, though both claimants have 
an inherent right to explore and exploit the given area, at the same time each claimant can 
preclude one another from embarking upon such activities in the area in question. 
Be that as it may, the economic and political implications for the States concerned are 
enormous. As Ong, a leading expert on the law of the sea, observes, ‘with regard to seabed 
resources which could prove crucial to the well-being and political stability of coastal states, 
extensive overlapping claims forestall development while boundaries remain uncertain’. 40 
Given that maritime delimitation, whether by agreement or by reference to third-party 
adjudication, has historically proven to be an extremely time-consuming process, 41  the 
interested States may not be able to afford to suspend the economic exploitation of the disputed 
areas pending delimitation. 42  It is understandable that, even while the boundary remains 
uncertain, the need for exploring and receiving the economic benefits from disputed natural 
resources remains imperative for economic, energy-security and political reasons. Clearly, 
there is a clash between the need for utilizing the disputed natural resources and the legal 
requirement not to infringe each State’s exclusive sovereign rights on the area in question. 
 
                                                 
37 Fox and others (n 5) 46. 
38 North Sea CS Cases (n 10) para 20. 
39 Ong (n 21) 773, 774. 
40 ibid. 
41 Lagoni (n 3) 346. 
42 Beckman and others (n 16) 100. 
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C. ASSESSING THE LEGALITY OF OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN 
DISPUTED WATERS UNDER UNCLOS 
1. Introduction to Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS 
The starting point in any question concerning the legal treatment of offshore petroleum 
exploration and exploitation activities must be UNCLOS which is the primary regulatory 
instrument with respect to the international uses of the oceans and the seas. However, the only 
provision in UNCLOS that directly applies to the duties of States affected by overlapping 
maritime claims is paragraph 3 found both in Article 74 concerning delimitation of the EEZ 
and Article 83 concerning delimitation of the continental shelf. Paragraph 3 in both Articles 
reads as follows: 
Pending [delimitation]… the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and 
cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a 
practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the 
reaching of the final agreement. 
Taken literally, paragraph 3 does not limit de iure the sovereign powers of coastal States for 
the exploration and exploitation of their continental shelf/EEZ areas.43 In fact, as mentioned 
above, these substantial sovereign rights already inhere to coastal States by virtue of UNCLOS 
and customary international law. Rather, Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS introduce some 
procedural obligations which seem to restrain the exercise of these powers.44 These require 
States, firstly, to ‘make every effort’ to conclude ‘provisional arrangements of practical nature’ 
and, secondly, ‘not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final delimitation agreement’.45 
No explicit clarification is given regarding the kind of activities that would ‘jeopardize or 
hamper’ the final delimitation agreement and would thus be prohibited. Furthermore, the 
language used in this provision (ie ‘shall make every effort’) does not clarify the meaning of 
the procedural requirement to enter into provisional arrangement, 46  in other words, the 
circumstances under which this obligation can be considered as fulfilled. However, all these 
aspects are crucial in understanding the legal rights and obligations of States with respect to oil 
and gas activities in disputed maritime areas. 
                                                 
43  Irini Papanicolopulu, ‘Enforcement Actions in Contested Waters: The Legal Regime’ (International 
Hydrographic Organization conference, Monaco, 25 October 2010) 4 
<www.iho.int/mtg_docs/com_wg/ABLOS/ABLOS_Conf6/S7P2-P.pdf> accessed 30 December 2015. 
44 Lagoni (n 3) 362.  
45 Virginia Commentary (n 27) 815, 984. 
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As a consequence, it is essential to examine the relevant international jurisprudence, 
academic literature and State practice on the application of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of 
UNCLOS in order to ascertain their substantial scope of application and the extent to which 
they relate to oil and gas operations in disputed areas. Before doing so, however, it is useful to 
review the drafting history of Articles 74 and 83, particularly the negotiations that led to the 
formation of paragraph 3 of the said Articles, in order to understand how the rationale 
underpinning its inception evolved in the minds of UNCLOS drafters: from the early 
negotiations until its final construction. 
2. Drafting History of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS 
It would be going too far to say that, during the negotiations at UNCLOS, no attention was 
paid to the question of provisional measures pending delimitation but it would be true to say 
that this issue was not a priority for UNCLOS drafters. This is because the greatest part of the 
discussions on delimitation centred upon the formation of a commonly acceptable delimitation 
rule or principle,47 rather than on interim solutions per se. Nonetheless, the intrinsic correlation 
between the problems arising from delimitation, clash of sovereign resource exploitation rights, 
protracted negotiating proceedings etc, and the need for some kind of solution in the interim 
prompted drafters to simultaneously address the two issues in the same provision.48 It would 
appear that, in the course of negotiations, two competing approaches were advanced by the 
delegations as interim solutions: a) the establishment of a moratorium with regards to all 
resource-exploitation activities in disputed areas and; b) the conclusion of ‘provisional 
arrangements’ pending final agreement on delimitation. As will be seen hereinafter, the final 
draft of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) constitutes a blend between these two elements, namely the 
‘restricting’ element of prohibiting certain economic acts in the disputed areas and the 
‘incentive’ element of provisional cooperative arrangements. 
The first proposals to touch the issue of interim solutions were made by the Netherlands 
and Ireland during the second session of the Conference in 1974.49 Paragraph 2 of the Dutch 
proposal provided that, pending an agreement on delimitation, ‘neither of the States is entitled 
                                                 
47 Particularly the conflict between States which favoured equidistance (the pro-equidistance group) and those 
favouring a concept exclusively based on equity (pro-equity group); Edward D Brown, ‘Delimitation of Offshore 
Areas-Hard Labour and Bitter Fruits at UNCLOS III’ (1981) 5(3) MP 172, 179-180; Tanja (n 30) xvi. 
48 Lagoni (n 3) 348.  
49  ‘Netherlands: Draft Article on Delimitation Between States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts’ UN Doc 
A/CONF 62/C2/L14 (1974), reproduced in Virginia Commentary (n 27) 803, 804; ‘Ireland: Draft Article on 
Delimitation of Areas of Continental Shelf Between Neighbouring States’ UN Doc A/CONF62/C2/L43 (1974), 
reproduced in Lagoni (n 3) 350. 
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to establish its marine boundaries beyond the [median] line…’.50 Along the same basis, Ireland 
proposed that pending delimitation, ‘no State is entitled to carry on exploration or exploitation 
activities in any areas which are claimed bona fide by any other State...’.51 Therefore, it can be 
seen that both the Dutch and the Irish proposals were couched in a rather prohibitive and 
preventive manner as their basic aim was to restrict all economic activities in the area of 
overlap. 
Following a number of informal discussions, a new draft proposal was introduced by 
the Chairman of the Second Committee in 1976.52 This proposal, provided that, ‘pending 
agreement or settlement, the States concerned shall make provisional arrangements…’.53 This 
was the first time the concept of ‘provisional arrangements’ had been presented as a possible 
interim solution during the discussions; it was at the expense, however, of the Dutch and Irish 
proposals. Despite the broad support this draft proposal seemed to have gathered initially,54 
some States attempted to reintroduce the prohibitive language of the initial draft proposals. 
Spain for example, during the sixth session in 1977, suggested that, pending delimitation, ‘the 
parties at dispute shall refrain from exercising their jurisdiction beyond the median or 
equidistance line unless they agree on alternative measures of mutual restraint’.55 In fact, it 
appears that many States not only supported the Spanish proposal56 but also were strongly in 
favour of a ‘moratorium against economic activities within the area under dispute’.57 However, 
this was not regarded as being broadly acceptable58 as several other States continued to favour 
the more incentive language of the Chairman’s proposal, as seen above.59 As a consequence, 
two diametrically opposing approaches emerged during the discussions: those which clearly 
aimed to restrain the activities of the interested States in the disputed area, 60  and those 
concerned with the adoption of practical measures that could promote the economic utilisation 
of disputed areas, pending delimitation.61 
                                                 
50 ‘Netherlands: Draft Article’ ibid; Given that any reference to the median or equidistance line, even as an interim 
solution, was not likely to receive much support from pro-equity States, the Dutch proposal was dismissed during 
the fourth session. 
51 ‘Ireland: Draft Article’ (n 49).  
52 UNCLOS ‘49th Meeting of the Second Committee’ (16 March 1976) Off Rec UNCLOS III, vol V, 153. 
53 UNCLOS Draft Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS (1979) 18 ILM 686. 
54 ‘49th Meeting of the Second Committee’ (n 52). 
55 ‘Informal Proposal by Spain’, reproduced in Virginia Commentary (n 27) 811. 
56 Lagoni (n 3) 351, 352. 
57  ‘Informal Proposal by Papua New Guinea’, reproduced in Renate Platzoder (ed) Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents Vol IV (Oceana Publications 1983) 406.  
58 ‘Statement by the Chairman at the 28th Meeting of NG7’ (12 Sept 1978), reproduced in Lagoni (n3) 352.  
59 ibid. 
60 See: Netherland’s and Ireland’s draft proposals (n 49).  
61 Lagoni (n 3) 351. 
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One year later, in 1979, after more than twenty-seven negotiating sessions had elapsed, 
a renewed proposal was submitted jointly by India, Iraq and Morocco. This provided that:  
Pending agreement or settlement, the States concerned shall, in a spirit of co-operation, 
freely enter into provisional arrangements [and] shall refrain from activities or measures 
which may aggravate the situation or jeopardize the interests of either State...62 
Interestingly, this provision was welcomed by the majority of delegates and following some 
minor changes in 1980, led to the formation of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS 
as appears in 2016.63  
The review of the drafting history of UNCLOS reveals some important findings with 
respect to the purpose and objectives of Articles 74(3) and 83(3). It would appear that the 
conflict between different approaches on interim measures, as emerged during the negotiating 
sessions, led to the conclusion of a compromise formula which constituted a blend of two 
elements: the ‘incentive’ element of provisional arrangements and the ‘restricting’ element of 
prohibiting certain economic acts in the disputed region. It might thus be said that Articles 
74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS have a twofold objective: while the first sentence aims to promote 
the adoption of practical interim measures towards the provisional economic exploitation of 
yet-to-be delimited areas, the second seeks to restrict the economic activities of the disputing 
States in the given area, pending the final settlement of their dispute.64 Such understanding of 
paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 is consistent with the overall objective of UNCLOS, which 
according to its preamble, is ‘to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, all 
issues relating to the law of the sea’ and ‘a legal order for the seas and oceans which will 
facilitate … the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources [with] due regard for the 
sovereignty of all States’. 
The following section ascertains the extent to which the above provision relates to oil 
and gas operations in disputed areas. Given that Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS are 
basically a combination of two different elements, different considerations apply to each of the 
two elements. Accordingly, for the sake of coherence and analytical clarity, these will be 
separately examined further below. 
3. Obligation to ‘Make Every Effort’: Interpreted 
According to the first sentence of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS, ‘the States concerned, 
in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
                                                 
62 ‘Informal Proposal by India, Iraq, and Morocco’ (5 April 1979) reproduced in Platzoder (n 57) 448.  
63 Lagoni (n 3) 353.  
64 This conclusion is also supported by the Virginia Commentary (n 27) 815, 984.  
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arrangements…’.65 In light of its objectives, as seen above, this provision may be paraphrased 
as ‘States concerned are required to make every effort to come to some agreement towards the 
economic exploitation of the disputed area, pending the final settlement of their dispute’. 
However, what does ‘make every effort’ mean in practice and how can an international court 
or tribunal determine whether a State has fulfilled or breached this obligation in the context of 
oil and gas activities in disputed waters? 
Professor Lagoni suggested that the language used in paragraph 3, that ‘every effort’ 
should be conducted ‘in a spirit of understanding and cooperation’, echoes the traditional legal 
concept of good faith.66 Indeed, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases of 1969, the ICJ 
found that good faith ‘is a principle which underlies all international relations, and which is 
moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations as one of the methods 
for the peaceful settlement of international disputes’.67 Lagoni’s view is also supported by the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case of 1974, where the ICJ held that both parties in dispute were ‘under 
mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their 
differences concerning their respective rights in the areas [in question]’.68 More recently, under 
the UNCLOS regime, the Guyana/Suriname Tribunal explained that the inclusion of the phrase 
‘in a spirit of understanding and cooperation’ indicates ‘the drafters’ intent to require of the 
parties a conciliatory approach to negotiations, pursuant to which they would be prepared to 
make concessions in the pursuit of a provisional arrangement…’.69 Thus, it is suggested that 
States are under a procedural duty to engage in ‘meaningful’ negotiations (ie not simply for the 
sake of negotiations but with a realistic view to arriving at an agreement).70 This will not be 
the case when, for example, ‘either [State] insists upon its own position without contemplating 
any modification of it’.71  
However, it is important to note that the procedural obligation to negotiate in good faith 
and seek provisional arrangements of practical nature does not imply an obligation to agree 
upon any provisional regime.72 Indeed, in the words of Lord McNair, there is a ‘valid obligation 
upon the parties to negotiate in good faith, and a refusal to do so amounts to a breach of the 
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66 Lagoni (n 3) 355. 
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obligation. But the obligation is not the same as an obligation to conclude a treaty or to accede 
to an existing treaty...’.73 It can be concluded that States engaged in overlapping maritime 
claims are under a procedural obligation to engage in meaningful negotiations and make every 
possible effort to reach an agreement on the provisional economic exploitation of the area in 
question.74 
Turning now to the specific application of this obligation, it is noteworthy that the only 
case in which an international adjudicating body was called to determine the scope of 
application of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS in the context of oil and gas operations 
was the Guyana/Suriname Arbitration of 2007. In this case, both parties claimed that the 
conduct of the other had breached Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS, namely, the obligation 
‘to make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements’ and ‘not to jeopardize or hamper 
the reaching of the final agreement’. With regard to the first obligation, Suriname claimed that 
Guyana had violated its duty to make every effort by ‘persistently’ demanding the former to 
allow CGX, Guyanese concessionaire, to conduct exploratory drilling in the disputed area.75 
On its side, Guyana claimed that ‘Suriname, both before and after the CGX incident,76 failed 
to make serious efforts to negotiate provisional arrangements.’77 
The Tribunal made a notable remark in stating that both States had breached their duty 
to make every effort to reach provisional arrangements, though for different reasons. As regards 
Suriname, the Tribunal found that it did not actively attempt to engage in meaningful 
discussions with Guyana as the latter had repeatedly requested.78 Rather, Suriname opted for a 
harder stance by resorting to self-help and threatening the CGX rig.79 As a consequence, it 
‘failed… in its duties under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention’.80 Likewise, Guyana 
was found to have breached its duty to make every effort by not informing Suriname at an early 
stage of its concessionaire’s plans to commence exploratory drilling in the disputed area.81 
Most importantly, the Tribunal outlined a number of steps that Guyana should have made in 
order to satisfy the above obligation. These included inter alia ‘seeking cooperation of 
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Suriname in undertaking the activities’ and ‘offering to share the results of the exploration and 
giving Suriname an opportunity to observe the activities’.82 
4. Obligation of Mutual Restraint: Interpreted 
The second sentence of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS requires States to abstain from 
any acts that would ‘jeopardize or hamper’ the final delimitation agreement. However, no 
express prohibition against certain petroleum activities, such as seismic surveys and 
exploratory or production drilling, is provided by this rule. The Virginia Commentary, one of 
the most important authorities on UNCLOS, does not clarify the scope of this restriction either. 
It simply observes that not all activities in the disputed area are prohibited but only those which 
would have the effect of ‘harming or jeopardising’ the final agreement.83  
Arguably, any unilateral act, whether in the form of geophysical surveys, exploratory 
or production drilling, could potentially exacerbate the tension between the disputing parties 
and lead their negotiations on delimitation into a deadlock. However, an analysis of the relevant 
literature indicates that most commentators interpret this obligation lato sensu. 84  More 
specifically, they argue that since Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS do not spell out which 
particular activities are prohibited, coastal States remain free to exercise their rights in the area 
so long as they do not irremediably deprive the other States concerned of their equally valid 
rights in the area in question.85 For example, it is often suggested that marine scientific research 
within the disputed area, even for the purpose of ascertaining the likelihood of hydrocarbon-
bearing accumulations, would not necessarily hamper the reaching of the final agreement on 
delimitation.86 Along the same line, some other commentators agree that coastal States are 
obliged to refrain only from the kind of actions that risk depriving other states of the gains they 
might have otherwise realised by exercising their sovereign right of exploitation.87 Obviously, 
this refers to the actual appropriation of natural resources from the areas under overlapping 
claims. 
Interestingly, it seems that the central legal basis of this approach lies in the order of 
the ICJ on the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case of 1976 concerning Greece’s request for the 
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indication of interim measures of protection under Article 41 of the Statute of the ICJ.88 Though 
UNCLOS came into force almost two decades later, this was the only case where an 
international court examined the legality of oil and gas operations in disputed waters, a fact 
which explains the unusual authority of this case on the matter, even under the UNCLOS 
regime. In this case, Greece requested the Court to determine the continental shelf boundary 
between the two States89 and, pending the final decision, to order, under Article 41 of the 
Statute of the ICJ,90 cessation of all Turkish exploration activities in the disputed areas of the 
Aegean Sea.91 In its application, Greece stressed that pending the delimitation of the area in 
question, any unauthorised exploration activities in the said area would be in breach of its 
‘sovereign and exclusive rights to explore and exploit its continental shelf and authorize 
scientific research respecting the continental shelf’.92 The Court rejected Greece’s request on 
the basis that the ‘effects of the alleged breach by Turkey would be reparable by appropriate 
means’,93 if the final judgment were to be delivered in favour of Greece. More specifically, the 
Court observed that the Turkish seismic exploration activities did not involve the establishment 
of any drilling installations or the actual appropriation of natural resources or any risk of 
physical damage to the seabed or subsoil of the area under dispute.94 In other words, the Court 
drew a distinction between exploratory activities of a transitory character, such as seismic 
surveys, and those that are likely to cause a permanent effect on the marine environment of the 
disputed areas, such as drilling and establishment of installations.95  
Quite remarkably, the Guyana/Suriname Tribunal drew heavily upon the Aegean Sea 
Case, particularly when assessing the legality of unilateral exploratory drilling under Articles 
74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS. More specifically, the Tribunal noted that: 
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Activities that would meet the standard required for the indication of interim measures, 
in other words, activities that would justify the use of an exceptional power due to their 
potential to cause irreparable prejudice, would easily meet the lower threshold of 
hampering or jeopardising the reaching of a final agreement.96 
In other words, the Guyana/Suriname Tribunal, in considering the application of Articles 74(3) 
and 83(3) of UNCLOS, aligned its reasoning with the criteria used by international courts and 
tribunals in assessing a request for interim measures of protection. This led the Tribunal to 
declare that it should not be permissible for a party to a dispute to undertake any unilateral 
drilling activity since this would prejudice the other party’s rights in a permanent manner.97 On 
the other hand, seismic surveys were considered, obiter dictum, as legally permissible due to 
their lower threshold of impact.98 
5. Unilateral Seismic Surveys in Disputed Waters 
Notwithstanding the important value of the Aegean Sea Case and Guyana/Suriname Case in 
assessing the legality of petroleum operations in disputed waters, not all the legal uncertainties 
surrounding the issue have been resolved. The view that certain activities, due to their 
manifestly prejudicial and irreparable effect, can justify the prescription of interim measures 
of protection, cannot in itself imply that any other petroleum activities in the disputed area 
should be permissible under international law. As a matter of fact, the present analysis finds 
that there are a number of arguments to support the proposition that, under the present 
framework of international law, unauthorised seismic surveys in disputed areas are illegal. 
To begin with, despite the Guyana/Suriname Tribunal’s ruling that seismic surveys in 
disputed waters should be permissible,99 one must not disregard the fact that none of the parties 
involved in the given case had challenged the legality of such activities.100 On the contrary, the 
historic background of this dispute indicates that both Guyana and Suriname had been 
authorising and conducting seismic activities in the disputed areas for over three decades101 
without causing, however, any tensions in their relationship. As a result, it would not be 
unreasonable to argue that both countries had tacitly consented in a sense to each other’s 
seismic activities in the disputed area. Indeed, the key incident that fuelled the dispute had 
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nothing to do with seismic surveys, but with the intention of Guyana to undertake exploratory 
drilling. In light of these circumstances, the Guyana/Suriname Tribunal was essentially 
prompted to observe that unilateral seismic surveys, in the given case, neither prejudiced nor 
harmed the reaching of the final delimitation agreement as neither State seemed to be frustrated 
by the conduct of such operations. Indeed, in the words of the Tribunal: 
Both Parties authorised concession holders to undertake seismic testing in disputed 
waters, and these activities did not give rise to objections from either side. In the 
circumstances at hand, the Tribunal does not consider that unilateral seismic testing is 
inconsistent with a party’s obligation to make every effort not to jeopardise or hamper 
the reaching of a final agreement.102 
Nonetheless, when reviewing the factual background of the Aegean Sea Case, for example, 
where Turkey’s unauthorised seismic activities in the disputed area, and the fierce reaction of 
Greece, almost led the two States into an armed conflict, the legal treatment of unilateral 
seismic surveys cannot be the same. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the Guyana/Suriname Case, 
Turkey’s unilateral seismic surveys in the Aegean Sea did have the effect of escalating the 
conflict so much that the task of delimitation became almost elusive. This is further illustrated 
by the fact that the most recent hydrocarbon exploration licenses granted by Turkey to its 
National Oil Company, TRAO,103 were also met with fierce diplomatic protests from Greece 
as some of the permit blocks were considered to be in areas of the Greek continental shelf.104 
Even though Turkey rejected Greece’s claim,105 no further seismic or drilling activities have 
been undertaken by Turkey, or Greece, in the Aegean Sea since then.106 
Secondly, at the time of drafting this paper, the Special Chamber of the International 
Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) considered an application by Côte d’Ivoire asking 
Ghana to be ordered to ‘suspend all oil exploration and exploitation operations under way’ in 
the maritime area which was the subject of dispute between the parties.107 As it turns out, this 
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is the first time in the history of UNCLOS that a Special Chamber, formed by the ITLOS, has 
received a request for provisional measures and only the second time in international judicial 
practice that provisional measures have been sought against the undertaking of petroleum 
operations without consent in contested waters (the first one being the Aegean Sea Case of 
1976). It is therefore worthwhile to review some of the central arguments in and the 
determination of this application by the Special Chamber.  
In its application Côte d’Ivoire argued, inter alia, that the ongoing exploration and 
exploitation activities by Ghana caused a serious and irreversible harm to Côte d’Ivoire’s 
sovereign exploration and exploitation rights.108 More specifically, Côte d’Ivoire argued that 
the conduct of geophysical investigations by Ghana constituted an infringement of the 
exclusive right of Côte d’Ivoire to conduct maritime scientific research, pursuant to Article 
246(5) of UNCLOS, and its associated right to access, possess and control all confidential 
information relating to the exploration of the continental shelf. This, according to Côte d’Ivoire, 
formed an indispensable part of a coastal State’s sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring 
the continental shelf and exploiting its natural resources as provided for in Article 77 of 
UNCLOS.109 Overall, Côte d’Ivoire emphasised that the actions of Ghana not only caused a 
serious and irreversible harm to Côte d’Ivoire’s exclusive right to explore and exploit its natural 
resources but also irremediably deprived Côte d’Ivoire of its sovereign right to formulate and 
implement its national energy policy. This included its right to decide ‘when, how and under 
what conditions the exploitation of these resources will take place, and even whether it should 
take place’.110  
In its decision, the Special Chamber recognised, first of all, that drilling causes a 
‘permanent physical modification’ of the area in dispute which no form of financial 
compensation or reparation can restore.111 Most importantly, it found that the acquisition and 
subsequent use of geological information of the disputed area would create a risk of 
‘irreversible prejudice to the rights of Côte d’Ivoire’ should the Special Chamber, in its decision 
on the merits, find that Côte d’Ivoire has rights in all or any part of the disputed area.112 
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The Special Chamber went on to order Ghana to refrain from undertaking new drilling 
in the disputed area. Nonetheless, the Special Chamber did not order Ghana to suspend ongoing 
seismic surveys but rather to ‘take all necessary steps to prevent information resulting from 
past, ongoing or future exploration activities conducted by Ghana… from being used in any 
way whatsoever to the detriment of Côte d’Ivoire’.113 In other words, it would seem that the 
Special Chamber acknowledged the irreparable infringement of Côte d’Ivoire’s alleged 
exploration rights, caused by Ghana’s unilateral geophysical surveys, but refrained from 
ordering the immediate suspension of such surveys.  
What must be borne in mind in this discussion is that both the ICJ’s order on the Aegean 
Sea Case of 1976 and the ITLOS order on the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Case of 2015 exclusively 
concerned the application of interim measures of protection.114 However, the law relating to 
interim measures of protection does not necessarily coincide in all respects with the obligations 
in Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS. As mentioned above, interim protection is an 
exceptional procedural right the essence of which lies in the preservation of the parties’ alleged 
rights pendente litis. Key here is what actual harm a state might suffer pending the final 
judgment. Articles 83(3) and 74(3) of UNCLOS address the procedural duties of States to enter 
into meaningful negotiations in good faith and refrain from any unilateral actions that might 
have the effect of hampering the reaching of the final delimitation solution. The central 
condition here is actions that might have this effect. 
Clearly, interim measures require a higher threshold of harm suffered by a State while 
awaiting the final verdict, compared to the condition stipulated by Articles 83(3) and 74(3) of 
UNCLOS.115 Indeed, whereas the indication or prescription of interim measures requires the 
‘risk of an irreparable prejudice to rights [of either party] in issue in the proceedings’, 116 
Articles 83(3) and 74(3) simply refer to acts that might ‘jeopardize or hamper’ the final 
delimitation agreement. In fact, the power of the Court to order interim measures is an 
exceptional one117 and presupposes that there is a serious and irreversible prejudice to the rights 
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in issue which ‘[cannot] be erased by the payment of reparation or compensation to be ordered 
in later judgment on the merits’.118  
Therefore, activities that give rise to a breach of the alleged rights, but are nonetheless 
reparable by appropriate means, such as compensation,119 do not warrant the indication of 
interim measures.120 As a matter of fact, Greece’s request was dismissed, but not because the 
Court did not recognise that seismic surveys by Turkey violated Greece’s exclusive rights of 
exploration.121 On the contrary, the Court recognised that Turkey’s activities, without the 
consent of Greece, ‘might, no doubt, raise a question of infringement of the latter's exclusive 
right of exploration’.122 Greece’s request was dismissed because this clear violation of its 
substantial exploration rights was deemed as capable of reparation by appropriate means. Put 
differently, if Turkey’s exploration activities had been conducted in an area that was 
subsequently found to be Greek continental shelf, Turkey would have committed a breach of 
Greece’s sovereign rights for which appropriate reparation would have been required.123 The 
same holds true in the ITLOS case between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.  
Consequently, even though unilateral seismic surveys in disputed areas do not 
necessarily cause an irreparable and irreversible harm that warrants interim protection, the 
conduct of such activities does, undoubtedly, infringe the other State's alleged right of 
exploring its continental shelf. This suggests that if the circumstances of the case demonstrate 
that the unconsented seismic exploration activities would have the effect of aggravating the 
dispute to the extent that discussions on final delimitation are adversely affected,124 they may 
well be considered as a breach of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS. 
Furthermore, it is worthwhile recalling that the Guyana/Suriname Tribunal established 
certain steps which Guyana, ‘in a spirit of cooperation and understanding’,125 should have taken 
before authorising any drilling operations in the disputed area, including, among others, 
offering to share the results of the exploration and giving Suriname an opportunity to monitor 
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ongoing drilling activities.126 Nonetheless, the Tribunal omitted to impose similar conditions 
for seismic exploration operations. This approach seems, however, rather questionable 
because, as with the obligation to seek provisional arrangements, the obligation of mutual 
restrain is also covered by the general legal requirement ‘to make every effort in a spirit of 
understanding and cooperation’ which, as mentioned earlier, echoes the fundamental legal 
principle of ‘good faith’. Indeed, as the ICJ stated, this principle ‘underlies all international 
relations’.127 Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to argue that any seismic tests in disputed 
areas, though unilateral, should be conducted in a ‘spirit of understanding and cooperation’, ie 
in good faith. As a result, the willingness of the initiating State to share the results of seismic 
exploration and allow the other State to monitor these activities would be a prerequisite to the 
fulfillment of this requirement. This argument is also consistent with analogous examples in 
international law. For instance, Article 3 of the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States establishes that, ‘in the exploration of natural resources shared by two or more 
countries, each State must co-operate on the basis of a system of information and prior 
consultations…’.128 Taking the above into consideration, it might be suggested that unilateral 
seismic tests in disputed waters should not be permissible, unless the party undertaking such 
activities is willing, in accordance with the principle of good faith, to share the results of 
exploration and allow the other State to monitor the whole procedure. 
Finally, as mentioned above, one of the central arguments advanced by scholars to 
support that unilateral seismic activities in disputed waters are legally permissible is the fact 
that such activities, unlike drilling, cannot cause physical damage to the marine environment 
of the disputed area. On the contrary, several marine-scientific reports have concluded that the 
high volumes of acoustic energy, commonly released during seismic operations,129 may have 
an adverse environmental impact on the marine life130 and commercial fishing operations in or 
near the area in question.131 Directly related to this important consideration is the fact that, 
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under present international law, all coastal States have the exclusive jurisdiction to adopt the 
necessary regulatory measures for the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
of their EEZs,132 as well as the exclusive right to explore and exploit their natural resources in 
accordance with their own environmental policies.133 Moreover, States have the exclusive 
jurisdiction to authorise scientific research,134 including seismic testing.135 To that end, coastal 
States have the right to object to and order the cessation of any marine scientific project 
associated with the exploration and exploitation of natural resources.136 Pursuant to the rights 
above, many coastal States have enabled regulations requiring prospective licensees to submit 
detailed environmental impact assessments (EIA) prior to the conduct of any seismic surveys, 
especially if such activities are likely to occur in areas sensitive to protected marine species or 
fisheries.137 The purpose of an EIA is to provide the coastal State with information on all the 
possible adverse impacts of the proposed activity and the measures through which the licensee 
purports to diminish or at least mitigate these risks to the lowest levels.138  
Therefore, given that the enactment and exercise of these rights does not distinguish 
between delimited or disputed maritime areas,139 a State’s ability to control, safeguard and 
apply its own environmental and regulatory policies on the marine environment of the EEZ 
and continental shelf areas appertaining to it should, in any case, be respected. Interestingly 
enough, this was one of the main arguments raised by Côte d’Ivoire in its latest application 
before the ITLOS in which it contended that Ghana’s unilateral actions deprive Côte d’Ivoire 
of its ‘right to select the oil companies to conduct exploration and exploitation operations and 
freely to determine the terms and conditions in its own best interest and in accordance with its 
own requirements with respect to oil and the environment’.140 As seen above, the Special 
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Chamber acknowledged the existence of this right.141  As a consequence, there is enough 
evidence to prove that unauthorised seismic surveys in disputed waters override the sovereign 
right and exclusive jurisdiction of coastal States to regulate, control and safeguard the marine 
environment of their EEZ and continental shelf areas. Thus, none of the disputing States 
operates legitimately in undertaking such acts on a unilateral basis. 
 
D. IMPACT ON OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 
The analysis above has demonstrated that, under present international law, States are obliged 
to refrain from undertaking any unilateral oil and gas activities in disputed waters should the 
latter prove to aggravate the dispute. What must be kept in mind, however, is that the legal 
considerations above are by no means of purely academic importance but may also have some 
serious practical implications on the development of the disputed natural resources. 
First and foremost, it is noteworthy that in the absence of the necessary exploration 
activities, both in terms of seismic testing and exploratory drilling, the exact location and 
commercial quantity and quality of the area’s hydrocarbon deposits cannot be ascertained.142 
Notwithstanding that geophysical exploration techniques have been considerably improved 
during the past decades, 143  exploration for new oil reservoirs still remains a high-risk 
activity.144 Indeed, according to petroleum geologists, even if seismic testing has taken place 
and the geological conditions of the area in question seem to be promising,145 only the drilling 
of an exploration well can indicate whether the relevant area is commercially exploitable or 
not. 146  Moreover, drilling is critically important in terms of understanding the structural 
properties of the sea-bed for the purpose of constructing rigs and mooring buoys as foundations 
for platforms and for laying pipelines.147 However, as it has been previously explained, any 
kind of drilling in disputed areas without the consent of other interested State(s) is prohibited 
under international law and can be ceased through the application of provisional measures if 
the dispute is submitted before an international court or tribunal. 
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That being the case, unless States agree on a boundary or enter a provisional cooperative 
arrangement, there would be only two options, or lines of action, available to the States 
concerned. The first option is that, pending the final settlement of the dispute, no unilateral 
action, including any form of drilling, is to be conducted by either State in the disputed area. 
Given, however, the significance of drilling in terms of new oil-field development, this option 
implies that the economic exploitation of the disputed area cannot go forward pending 
delimitation. The Aegean Sea is an example of this situation. There, Greece and Turkey agreed 
to refrain from any acts that would aggravate their dispute, including the authorisation and 
conduct of exploration activities in the disputed area.148 As a result, given that no delimitation 
agreement between the two States has been reached so far, the mineral potentials of the Aegean 
Sea remain to date unexploited.149  
Another theoretically possible scenario is when either, or both, interested States choose 
to authorise and conduct exploratory drilling in the disputed areas, on a unilateral basis, despite 
the subsequent legal and political consequences that such arbitrary actions may entail. The 
recent incident between China and Vietnam in the disputed waters of the South China Sea 
represents an illustrative example of this scenario. More specifically, in May 2014, the Chinese 
State-owned China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) commenced drilling operations 
near the disputed Paracel Islands, 150  120 nautical miles off the coast of the Vietnamese 
mainland.151 In spite of strong protests by Vietnam, China refused to halt its drilling operations, 
stating that the rig was placed ‘completely within the waters of China’s Paracel Islands.’152 The 
event received a great deal of publicity and triggered massive anti-Chinese riots within 
Vietnam, especially when the latter accused China of ramming and sinking a Vietnamese vessel 
which was at the vicinity of the rig.153 At least two people were killed during the riots, while 
many Chinese-run factories were burned to the ground, and several supply operations had to 
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be halted for security reasons.154 The United States, a powerful actor in the area, called on 
China to ‘freeze’ its provocative actions and seek to diffuse tension in the area.155 
In the light of the above, on 15 July 2014, China announced that it was withdrawing its 
2 billion dollar rig from the disputed area, almost one and a half months before the end of the 
envisaged drilling schedule. 156  Most importantly, in October 2015, China proposed joint 
maritime drills with South China Sea claimants as an attempt at ‘jointly solving disputes and 
controlling risks’.157 It would appear that the dangerously escalating nationalistic overtones in 
the Vietnamese mainland and the risk of prejudicing its relations with other State actors in the 
area, such as the United States, prompted China to cease its drilling operations in the disputed 
South China Sea areas and turn to other cooperative and confidence-building mechanisms. It 
may thus be said that even though unilateral drilling remains a theoretically possible option, 
the huge geopolitical and legal risks it portends mean that such an option, at least from a 
commercial perspective, is highly unadvisable.158 
At this point, it is also very important to note that the development of offshore oil and 
gas deposits is, besides being a high-risk activity, an extremely expensive task as well.159 By 
way of example, a modern 3D seismic vessel costs around 100 million USD,160 seismic data 
acquisition and processing can be as high as 0.5 million USD for a small area of 100 square 
kilometres,161 whilst the cost of drilling an offshore well can be over 50 million USD.162 Given 
the huge capital outlays involved in offshore petroleum development, States often rely on the 
funds and technical expertise of international oil and gas companies to develop their indigenous 
hydrocarbon resources.163 The first step an international oil company will take in deciding what 
regions of the world are promising is evaluating and ascertaining the geological, technical, 
political, fiscal, and environmental conditions of the given regions. 164  Even if geological 
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conditions indicate the likelihood of technically recoverable hydrocarbons, political and 
economic conditions, such as government and regulatory stability, must also be favourable for 
the successful commercialisation of the said reserves.165 Oil companies must have a firm case-
scenario in place that the potential revenues from future production justify present investments 
in exploration.166 
Regions with undefined or disputed maritime borders are characterised by excessive 
territorial uncertainty. Specifically, there is uncertainty as to which of the two, or more, 
claimants holds exclusive rights and authority over petroleum operations in the area(s) in 
question. For oil companies, the corresponding effect of this uncertainty is the creation of 
moderate political risks: that is, the probability that the goals of their investment can be 
adversely affected by future changes in the political and national investment regime.167 As Lax 
notes, whereas uncertainty concerns a ‘subjective potentiality of loss’ based on existing 
political and economic conditions, a political risk is a ‘measurable probability of loss’ resulting 
from a change in those conditions.168 In that sense, oil companies cannot predict what the final 
outcome of the dispute will be, nor can they influence the adjudicating body’s decision. 
However, they are perfectly aware that the dispute may lead to a change of jurisdiction in which 
case their exploration and exploitation rights will not be guaranteed.169 According to some 
petroleum experts, ‘an uncertain or disputed international boundary is an additional risk factor’ 
the essence of which lies in the ‘uncertainty with regard to the geographic scope of a concession 
area’.170 Indeed, any company that knowingly decides to undertake investments in a disputed 
area could be left without a secure title to its investment if the relevant concession area is 
ultimately determined to belong to a neighbouring state, or if the latter seeks the termination of 
the ongoing petroleum operations through an injunction, pending the judicial settlement of the 
dispute. As the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) explained, ‘a 
secure investment framework including legal security of tenure is a sine qua non for the 
development [of offshore oil and gas deposits]’.171 However, none of these vital investment 
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conditions (ie regional stability, legal security of tenure, etc) can be guaranteed in areas subject 
to the overlapping sovereignty of two, or more, States. 
Last but not least, one must not fail to consider the reputational damage an oil company 
may face by engaging in unilateral petroleum activities in disputed waters.172 A recent example 
of this situation can be observed in the maritime boundary confrontation between Turkey and 
the Republic of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.173 There, the Italian oil company 
ENI, under a concession granted by Cyprus, proceeded to conduct a number of exploration 
activities in areas off the coast of Cyprus which were disputed by Turkey.174 In retaliation for 
ENI’s operations in Cyprus, Turkey suspended all its ongoing projects with ENI, including the 
construction of a major crude oil pipeline from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean. 175 
Likewise, returning to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict discussed above, it would appear that in 
2008, the Chinese Government warned a major oil company, ExxonMobil, to refrain from 
investing in the disputed waters off the coasts of Vietnam and near the Paracel Islands, 
otherwise ‘its future business interests on the [Chinese] mainland could be at risk’.176 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that, with respect to the economic development of 
disputed maritime areas, coastal States are under a procedural duty to negotiate in good faith 
with a view to reaching some form of cooperative joint agreement pending the final settlement 
of their boundaries. Simultaneously, coastal States are under a procedural obligation to refrain 
from any unilateral petroleum activities in disputed areas, particularly if the conduct of such 
activities proves to aggravate their dispute. Furthermore, the evidence from case law and State 
practice as presented above supports the idea that maritime delimitation disputes can have a 
catastrophic impact on the development of disputed offshore natural resources. Drilling is the 
only pragmatic means to identify petroleum deposits and international oil companies are not 
keen on investing their risk capital and resources in politically unsettled situations. The 
procedural obligations imposed on disputing States under UNCLOS, particularly to refrain 
from unilateral economic activities, combined with the moderate political risks that 
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characterise disputed regions, largely because of their undefined territorial status, mean that 
large offshore oil and gas investors most often tend to avoid venturing into those areas. 
Ultimately, in the absence of an agreed boundary, only provisional interstate cooperation, such 
as joint exploration and development, can enable disputing parties to facilitate investments and 
realise the economic potentials of disputed areas.177
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